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I agree with the main points of Eveline’s analysis of what she calls arguments from 
unacceptable consequences. I agree that argument from consequences is a distinctive 
argumentation scheme that applies to legal argumentation in the way she outlines. I also agree 
with the analysis of Alexy showing it to be a species of practical, goal-directed reasoning. And I 
agree that such practical reasoning is based on goals attributed to statutes. The application of this 
form of argument in the way she describes is fundamentally important for any attempt to grasp 
how rules are applied to facts in cases at trial. We already knew that the rational argumentation 
in such cases is defeasible, meaning that drawing an inference based on the application of a rule 
is an argument that can be defeated by some particulars of a case, once they are revealed by 
having applied the rule. Now we can grasp one especially important way in which some legal 
arguments are defeasible. If applying a rule to a case is shown to have consequences that are 
judicially unacceptable, that is a reason for defeating the argument based on that rule in that case. 
The examples presented by Eveline, and her analysis of the forms of argument in them, are 
subjects of fundamental importance in legal argumentation studies. By way of commentary, I 
will merely elaborate on some logical and historical aspects of the forms of argument she has 
cited.  
     In her footnote 3, she attributes the formulation of an argumentation scheme to me, calling it 
argument from consequences, mentioning that it can be positive or negative, and commenting 
that it is an acceptable way of arguing. Let’s begin by reviewing this argumentation scheme. 
Argument from consequences can take either of the two following forms, where S is a variable 
for a state of affairs that can be brought about (Walton, 1996, p. 76). 
 
Argumentation Scheme for Argument from Positive Consequences 
If S is brought about, then good consequences will (may plausibly) occur. 
Therefore, S should be brought about.  
 
Argumentation Scheme for Argument from Negative Consequences 
 If S is brought about then bad consequences will (may plausibly) occur.  
Therefore, S should not be brought about.  
 
In these schemes ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is determined in a dialogue according to goals of the 
proponent advocating the argument and the respondent who expresses doubts about it. For 
example, in legal argumentation, as Eveline noted (p.2), when the judge gives a negative 
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evaluation of the consequences in case, it is based on the purpose of a rule and the intentions of a 
rational legislator. I take this acknowledgement to imply that there exists a kind of dialogue, a 
framework of rational argumentation, between parties engaging in legal argumentation. 
Accordingly, if the respondent in the dialogue agrees that the cited consequences are good or 
bad, the argument from consequences will offer his a reason to bring about S or not to bring it 
about. There is a long history of recognition of this type of argument. Aristotle showed an 
awareness of it as a form of rational argument in Topica 117a7 - 117a15 where he wrote, “when 
two things are very similar to one another and we cannot detect any superiority in the one over 
the other, we must judge from their consequences; for that of which the consequence is a greater 
good is more worthy of choice, and, if the consequences are evil, that is more worthy of choice 
which is followed by the lesser evil.” Windes and Hastings (1965, p. 227) recognized argument 
from consequences when they wrote that one way of proving a proposition of action is to list and 
prove the benefits that will result from adopting it. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 
266) defined a type of argumentation they called “pragmatic,” which “permits the evaluation of 
an act or an event in terms of its favorable or unfavorable consequences.” All these writers refer 
to the same form of argument, that it can be called argument from consequences, and that it has a 
positive and a negative form.  
  Having staked out the tradition on what argument from consequences is generally taken 
to be in the literature, we can now turn to how Eveline sees this kind of argument as used in 
trials. The best way is to start with the leading example she cites, the Millenaar case. In this case, 
the husband was driving the car, and the wife was injured in the traffic accident. There is a rule 
in Dutch law saying that the driver has to pay for injury to the passenger caused by his fault. But 
then apply this rule to case in which the driver and passenger are man and wife, as in the 
Millenaar case. If the rule were to be applied to this case, “it would lead to the unacceptable 
result that the wife would be deprived of her right to compensation” (Feteris, p. 11). This is a bad 
consequence, therefore the rule should not be applied to it. It is clear then that what we have in 
such a case is an argument from negative consequences.  
      The bad consequence cited in the Millenaar case is not so just a bad causal consequence 
of the action of applying the rule. It is a consequence that is bad because it would undermine 
some goal that may be presumed to be relevant in a legal case. Thus it is not surprising that this 
form of argument in legal tradition is often called by other names like reductio ad absurdum, 
apagogical argument, or reasonable application of law, as Eveline noted (p. 1). It is a distinctive 
type of argumentation that has to with applying general rules, formulated in law as 
generalizations, to particular cases, called “facts” by lawyers. This form of argumentation arises 
from a case where two rules apply to case. The one rule, when applied to the facts, warrants an 
inference to conclusion A. The other rule, when applied to the same facts, warrants an inference 
to conclusion B. The problem is that A is contrary to B. For example in the Millnaar case, one 
rule says that the victim of an accident should have the right to compensation. But another rule 
says the driver has to pay for injury to the passenger caused by his fault. But if this rule is 
applied to the Millenaar case, it deprives the wife of her right to compensation. Applying the 
second rule negates what is supposed to be the outcome of applying the first one. The conclusion 
derived from applying the first rule conflicts with the conclusion derived from the second. As the 
Dutch Supreme Court wording puts it, applying the first rule is “so incompatible with the purport 
of the legal accident insurance” that it “should not be applied in the concrete case” (quoted by 
Feteris, p. 12).    
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This phenomenon is important for anyone interested in studying how legal case-based 
argumentation works. But it is also fundamentally important in two other contexts of the use of 
case-based argumentation. One is ethical argumentation, which is also based on applying general 
rules to facts (or assumed facts) of a particular case. Here we have the famous dilemmas of 
ethics, as in the Antigone case and the famous cases of medical ethics, like those concerning 
euthanasia. Such cases are usually classified as dilemmas. But the dilemma is based on 
argumentation from negative consequences and on goal-directed practical reasoning, as one can 
see in the Antigone case. In this case, Athenian law rules that anyone who buries a traitor is 
executed.  
 
Antigone has a familial duty to bury her brother. 
Antigone is obliged to her state not to bury a traitor. 
She must either bury her brother or not bury her brother. 
 
The dilemma arises because of the two goals (obligations) that lead to a conflict when 
applied to this particular case. The other context is that of rule-based expert systems as used in 
AI. Here we have the same phenomenon, arising where one rule applied to a knowledge base 
may lead to a conclusion opposed to the conclusion derived by applying another rule to the same 
set of facts. The Millenaar case, and the other legal cases cited by Eveline are instances of a kind 
of conflict of arguments, or opposed arguments, typically found in ethical argumentation and 
rule-based expert systems, as well as in legal argumentation. Another famous case of argument 
from consequences related to a dilemma of an ethical sort is of course the Pascal’s wager 
argument (Rescher, 1985). In this argument, I have to make a decision whether to be a believer 
or not, and the argument for believing is grounded on the good consequences it will have – a 
happy life now and some chance of eternal bliss later.   
There are two questions I would like to pose briefly. One concerns the nature the of the 
consequence relation that is used to apply to the facts of a case and derive the bad consequence 
by inference. Is this a causal relation, or is it some sort of defeasible inference relation used to 
derive defeasible inference from a set of facts and a rule? It should be recalled that Hamblin 
(1970, pp. 78-80) showed that there is a connection between reductio ad absurdum and causal 
reasoning in his analysis of the fallacy of non-cause as cause. But in this analysis he wrote, “The 
word cause is not here being used in its natural scientific sense at all, but in a purely logical 
sense.” There is no space to go into detail on this matter. I only wish to raise the question of 
whether the relation is one of logical consequence or causal consequence. It could well be, of 
course, that this distinction is a blurred one, given that we lack any exact and widely accepted 
theory of causation.  
The other question I would ask is how, in general, should arguments from consequences 
be evaluated? Some logic textbooks have classified this type of argumentation as a fallacy. 
Rescher (1964, p. 82) wrote in his textbook, “logically speaking, it is entirely irrelevant that 
certain undesirable consequences might derive from the rejection of a thesis, or certain benefits 
accrue from its acceptance”. He offered the following example (p. 82).  
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The United States had justice on its side in waging the Mexican war of 1848. To question 
this is unpatriotic, and would give comfort to our enemies by promoting the cause of 
defeatism. 
 
This example has always been very interesting to me, because the fallacy appears to be 
based on a dialectical shift.  The dialogue begins as a critical discussion on the ethical issue of 
which side in the war was supposedly more in the right or “had justice on its side.” The problem 
is that it appears to shift to a deliberation on the consequences of advocating one side in such a 
critical discussion. The argument that such advocacy would have the bad consequences of 
promoting defeatism appears to violate rule of the critical discussion if it is an attempt to prevent 
the advocate from expressing his viewpoint. This remark refers to the rule of the critical 
discussion that prevents a party from preventing the other party from advancing or casting doubt 
on a viewpoint.1
      Some typical cases of the argumentum ad misericordiam of a kind often cited by the 
logic textbooks as fallacious fall under the category of argumentation form negative 
consequences. Consider the following example from (Little, Wilson and Moore, 1955, p. 39). 
 
The attorney for the defense may, for example, bring into the courtroom the poorly-
dressed wife of the defendant, surrounded by pathetic children in rags, and thus say in 
effect to the jury, “If you send my client to the electric chair, you make a widow of this 
poor woman and orphans of these innocent children. What have they done to deserve 
this? 
 
Such an appeal to pity would be irrelevant and fallacious in criminal trial because the 
thesis to be proved or cast into doubt is the claim that the defendant is guilty of the charge. The 
argument that his family will suffer if he is convicted is not evidence that is relevant to proving 
or casting doubt on this thesis. In such a trial, argument from negative consequences is 
fallacious, whereas in the sentencing hearing after the trial, the same argument could be 
reasonable.  
I only mention these examples because they pose the question of how argumentation 
from consequences should be evaluated, in general. If this form of argument is sometimes 








                                                 
1 This set of rules can be found in (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 208-209), and also 
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